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El régimen de metas monetarias fue muy popular en las décadas de 1980 y 1990 entre 
los bancos centrales de países tanto industrializados como en desarrollo.  Este artículo 
presenta una amplia exploración empírica de las posibles razones de por qué los países 
escogen (y abandonan) el régimen de metas monetarias. Se utiliza un amplio conjunto 
de datos de panel mundial para el trato y control de grupos de países, aplicando cinco 
técnicas de estimación de datos de panel para variables dependientes de elección 
discreta, y se realizan pruebas de robustez para distintos grupos de control y períodos 
de tiempo. La evidencia muestra que la probabilidad de tener un régimen de metas 
monetarias en vigor aumenta robusta y significativamente con la apertura comercial, el 





Money targeting (MT) was a highly popular monetary regime among central banks in 
both industrial and developing countries during the 1980s and 1990s. This paper 
presents a comprehensive empirical exploration of the possible explanations of why 
countries choose (and abandon) a MT regime. The paper uses a large world panel 
dataset for treatment and control country groups, applies five panel-data estimation 
techniques for discrete-choice dependent variables, and conducts robustness checks for 
different control groups and time periods. The paper’s evidence shows that the 
likelihood of having MT in place declines significantly and robustly with trade 
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“We didn’t abandon monetary targets, they abandoned us” 
Gerald Bouey 




1.  Introduction 
 
In past decades, monetary (growth) aggregates were widely used as nominal anchors by 
central banks in both industrial and developing countries. Under the influence of the 
quantity theory of money and Friedmans’ constant money-growth advice, adoption of 
money-growth targeting (MT) grew popular in the 1970s. After the breakdown of Bretton 
Woods, the central banks of the largest industrial countries (including the U.S. Federal 
Reserve, the Bundesbank, the Bank of Japan, and the Bank of England, among others) 
adopted floating exchange rates and put in place monetary programs based on money-
growth rules.
1 Money-growth targets became the policy objective of choice and money was 
used as the key operational instrument of central banks in industrial and developing 
countries. 
Monetary policy control and effectiveness of money targets hinged on a stable demand 
for the monetary aggregate selected as the nominal anchor for the conduct of monetary 
policy. Yet technological progress, financial innovation, and international financial 
integration contributed to rising volatility and unpredictability of money demand in the 
1970s and 1980.
2 Therefore meeting money growth targets and using money as an 
operational instrument became increasingly difficult for central banks in many countries, 
which started looking for alternative monetary policy instruments and objectives. The U.S. 
Federal Reserve under President Volcker was the first central bank to shift from monetary 
operational instruments to an interest-based monetary instrument in the early 1980s, 
followed subsequently by other industrial and developing-country central banks. Yet 
money-growth targets were not abandoned as quickly. Almost one decade later, New 
Zealand was the first country in the world to come-up with and adopt an alternative 
nominal anchor for the conduct of monetary policy: inflation targeting (in 1989-1990). 
Coming to the realization spelled out so eloquently in this paper’s initial quote, a growing 
                                                 
1 Indeed, the general acceptance of the monetarist framework starts with (West) Germany late in 
1974, followed by United States, Switzerland and Canada in 1975, and United Kingdom, France 
and Australia in 1976 (Goodhart, 1989). 
2 Early, Goldfeld (1976) had reported the inability of money demand-based models for tracking the 
evolution of the quantity of money in the U.S. economy, a fact known as the case of the missing money.   2
number of countries found in inflation targeting a more effective monetary regime than 
MT.  
However, a number of largely developing countries has continued relying on MT 
targeting (see Figure 1). Some developing countries have continued with MT for their 
domestic currency under conditions of high de-facto dollarization. 
  To the best of our knowledge, there is no systematic research that focuses on the 
determinants of choosing (and abandoning) MT – as opposed to growing empirical work 
on the choice of inflation targeting and of alternative exchange-rate regimes.
3 The objective 
of this paper is to fill this void by undertaking a comprehensive empirical exploration of 
the possible determinants that may explain why countries choose a MT regime. 
We conduct our empirical research for a specification for the likelihood of having an 
MT regime in place, which depends on several structural variables that potentially affect the 
choice of MT against alternative monetary regimes. They include government budget 
balance, trade openness and GDP per-capita, besides the typical argument behind the 
abandonment of this kind of monetary frameworks (i.e. demand instability factors). We 
assemble a large dataset comprised by a treatment group of up to 29 MT countries and 34 
countries that do not target inflation, with three decades (1975-2005) of annual data. This 
allows making use of an unbalanced panel sample of up to 1,174 country-year observations. 
For robustness checks, we apply different panel-data estimation techniques for discrete-
choice dependent variables, comprising pooled-data estimators for logit and probit models, 
the conditional logit estimator for fixed effects, and logit and probit estimators for random 
effects – the three latter techniques allow for country heterogeneity. Finally, we check 
robustness of our model specification by testing its validity for different country and time 
sub-samples. 
The paper is laid out as follows. The next section introduces the general specification 
for the probability of having a MT regime in place and describes the panel-data methods 
for discrete-choice dependent variables that are applied subsequently. Section 3 describes 
the data and stylized facts reflected by descriptive statistics and correlations. Estimation 





                                                 
3 See Gerlach (1999), Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002), Carare and Stone (2003) and Hu (2006), 
and Rizzo (1998), Poirson (2001), von Hagen and Zhou (2004) and Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger 
(2003), respectively, to cite a few in this latter case.   3
2.  Specification and Estimation Technique 
 
Our general specification for the choice of MT (that is, the likelihood of having MT in 
place) broadens the set of potential determinants of the latter choice proposed by us. We 
start with a wide set of pre-conditions, which have been partly identified in the related 
theoretical literature. Table 1 list the full set of regressors used in this paper, identifying 
expected and estimated coefficient signs.  
Mainly, as Mishkin and Savastano (2000) argued, the evolution of more developed and 
diversified financial markets made harder the task of central banks focused on the control 
of money. We try to capture the role of these factors by using a financial development 
measure and constructing an indicator that summarize the inability of the central bank for 
effectively monitoring and controlling money
4 growth. 
We also control for some variables considered as structural, like trade openness and the 
fiscal position.  Moreover, for capturing the phenomenon by which, nowadays, the money-
based targeting regime mainly operates in the developing world we include the GDP per 
capita in our general specification. 
Regarding the results, we expect that the basic motives that jeopardize the successful 
implementation of MT exert a negative influence in the relative likelihood. Thus, we expect 
negative signs for the estimated values associated to financial development and our 
measure for the inability for controlling money. Taking into account the transition and the 
current distribution of monetary regimes around the world, we expect a negative influence 
of trade openness and fiscal position in the likelihood of adopting the MT, because, for 
instance, more open and equilibrated economies are more associated to the inflation 
targeting regime. 
We exploit the cross-section and time dimensions of our world sample by using panel-
data estimation techniques. The general specification of our regression model for the 
likelihood of having MT in place is as follows: 
 
t i, t i, i t i, ε X δ' μ Y + + =      (1) 
 
where Y is a vector of discrete-choice country-year variables for the MT regime (a dummy 
that takes a value of 1 for having MT in place, 0 otherwise), X is a matrix of country-year 
                                                 
4 The details of the variables regarding sources and motivation for their inclusion are shown in table 
1.   4
explanatory variables that were introduced above, μ is a vector of individual country effects 
that reflect unobservable country heterogeneity, δ is a vector of slope coefficients that are 
common to all countries, ε is a vector of error terms, and i and t are country and time 
indexes, respectively. 
Equation (1) is estimated using discrete-choice panel-data models, assuming either a 
logistic distribution (a logit model) or a normal distribution (a probit model) of the error 
term. 
Any source of unobservable heterogeneity that may explain the decision of whether to 
adopt the IT regime is captured by individual country effects. The first approach to deal 
with this setup would be estimating individual effects jointly with the model’s slope 
parameters. However, this practice has the problem that the joint estimation of country 
effects and slope parameters causes inconsistency of the latter in an asymptotic plan with 
large N and finite T (which is our case), a result due to Neyman and Scott (1948) and 
known as the incidental parameters problem. The incidental parameters are in this case the 
fixed effects because they compromise the large sample properties of δ 
5. In discrete-choice 
panel-data models the removal of the fixed effects is not as easy as in the linear panel-data 
model (e.g. the within estimator) and the strategy for doing so hinges on the specification 
of the model.
6 The basic fixed-effects discrete- choice panel-data estimator is known as the 
Conditional Logit Estimator (CLE) due to Andersen (1970) and extended by Chamberlain 
(1980).
7 
CLE evaluates the likelihood function as conditional on sufficient statistics that restrict 
estimation to those individuals whose choice varies over time. This means that CLE only 
considers individual movers in the likelihood function.
8 Therefore the drawback of CLE is 
that sample size is reduced by all individuals that are stayers over the sample period time. 
                                                 
5 It could be argued that this asymptotic plan does not hold in a country panel data set since we 
know that N is fixed and T could be very large. However, it seems to be that the large sample 
properties do not depend on the physical properties and that it is enough to have N larger than T. 
We thank Manuel Arellano for this clarification. 
6 See Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000) for an analysis of the conditions for removing fixed effects in 
dynamic discrete choice models. 
7 It is worth emphasizing that the extension of this method to the case of normally distributed 
errors is unfeasible in practice because it involves evaluation of many integrals, which is very 
computer-intensive. 
8 In order to clarify the notion of a sufficient statistic consider the case of a binary choice panel-data 
set with two periods (T=2). A sufficient statistic is given by a sum of observations equal to 1, since 
only in this case we know that the possible pairs are (0,1) and (1,0). Therefore the conditional fixed-
effects estimator only considers individuals with choices that sum unity for all (two) periods.   5
The panel-data literature distinguishes between fixed and random-effects estimators. In 
the case of discrete-choice models, selection between the two latter estimators is 
determined by different aspects than those found for linear models. CLE, the only feasible 
fixed-effects estimator for discrete-choice panel data, eliminates individual effects. The 
random effects estimator does not remove individual country effects; it assumes a typically 
normal distribution between individual effects and the variables of the model, using for the 
latter purpose semi non-parametric simulation techniques. Discrete-choice random effects 
for panel data is feasible available for both logit and normal distributions of the error term. 
Hence the trade-off between the fixed-effects CLE and the random-effects estimator 
for discrete-choice panel-data is the benefit of robustness of the former (as it is not 
restricted by any assumption on the joint distribution of individual effects and explanatory 
variables) and the benefit of larger sample size of the latter. 
Finally our estimation model is subject to potential endogeneity bias. For example, 
adoption of IT may strengthen the fiscal position and reduce inflation – two key potential 
determinants of having IT in place. Recent theoretical contributions by Arellano and 
Carrasco (2003) deal with this issue in the context of discrete-choice panel-data models 
using instrumental variables techniques, respectively. Yet the stringent assumptions on 
which the latter solutions rely are not very attractive. Therefore we follow an alternative 
approach by using first lags of most independent variables. 
 
 
3.  Data and Stylized Facts 
 
Before turning to the regression results in the next section, we describe briefly our 
sample data, focusing on their distribution and pair-wise simple correlations.
9 Table 4 lists 
65 countries that comprise our full sample by income groups. Figure 1 depicts the time 
tend of our dependent variable, that is, the number of countries with an MT regime during 
the full sample period joint with the sample of inflation targeters. MTers remain steadily at 
approximately 10 countries during the most part of 70s and 80s. At the beginning of the 
next decade, this number starts to decline as the alternative monetary policy framework 
(inflation targeting) becomes popular and widely accepted (compare the blue and yellow 
bars in this period). Note that the upward trend on the number of countries after 2000 is 
artificial as it is totally attributable to the change of source, namely, IMF. In figure 2 we 
split the countries with a MT regime in both groups of industrial and developing countries. 
                                                 
9 Data sources and definitions are discussed in the data appendix.   6
Here, it is clear that money-growth targeting was mainly a regime used by industrial 
countries during the 70s and 80s. Further, as we documented previously, that regime is 
currently restricted to the developing world. 
Figure 3 (4) plots the country distributions of five independent variables for the full 
sample (separately for MT and non-MT sub-samples) by box plots. The boxes in each box 
plot account for all observations within the 25-50 and 50-75 percentile range of variable 
distribution. Medians are reported as thin white lines inside each box. Outliers – 
observations falling outside the 25-75 percentile ranges – are depicted as dots. 
The following stylized facts emerge from Figure 3. The first two panels reports the 
annual world distribution of financial development and trade openness reflecting trend 
increases in medians and major increases in dispersion toward countries with exceptionally 
high levels of financial depth and trade integration. The government budget balance ratio 
to GDP shows a trend increase in its median and reduction in its dispersion, consistent 
with fiscal strengthening observed in industrial and developing countries alike since the 
1980s. World median growth is reflected by the trend rise in the median per-capita GDP 
level, with little change in cross-country GDP dispersion over time. Monetary volatility 
exhibits declining world trends over the last two decades. 
Now let’s turn to a comparison of medians and dispersions observed by the five latter 
independent variables in the treatment and control groups of country-year observations 
(Figure 4). We can not say anything about the differences in medians between MT and 
non-MT since statistically the conclusions are not very clear. Yet the dispersion of all 
variables is much larger in non-MT countries. 
Now we turn to the last piece of descriptive data statistics: cross-country and panel-
data pair-wise correlations between our model variables reported in the upper and lower 
diagonal matrixes in Table 3, respectively. Three results emerge. First, there are some 
differences between cross-country and panel-data correlation coefficients. Indeed, cross-
country correlations are more significant than those calculating for the panel data set as a 
whole. Second, correlations between the MT regime dummy and all independent variables 
are significant and exhibit expected signs only in the cross-country case. Finally any pair of 





   7
4.  Empirical results 
 
We report estimation results for the choice of MT (the likelihood of having MT in 
place), based on equation (1). Our empirical strategy starts with reporting full-sample 
results for different specifications based on fixed and random-effects logit and probit 
models (Table 4). Then we test our model for different sub-samples comprised by country 
groups according to income levels (Table 5) and a shorter time period (Table 6). We 
discuss the results subsequently. 
Table 4 reports estimation results for 3 specifications based on pooled, fixed-effects 
and random-effects regressions assuming a logit distribution for the error term. For the 
case of probit regressions we only report our preferred specification as in general the 
distribution assumed for the error term do not matter for results (i.e. we obtain the same 
significant results under both assumptions). In a first specification we test the robustness of 
our results by excluding the government budget balance as this variable present a restricted 
availability. We include the latter variable in a second specification which includes also the 
GDP per capita and trade openness as additional control variables. However, our preferred 
specification excludes only the GDP per capita because its weakness in the statistical sense.  
The stiff trade-off between fixed-effect and random-effect results – robustness of the 
former versus larger sample size of the latter – is reflected by the large sample size 
difference in our results (some 500 country-year observations for fixed-effect and 1000 
observations for random-effect estimations). The treatment group is the same under fixed 
and random effects – it is comprised by all country-year observations of MT countries 
since their MT starting dates. Under fixed effects, the full sample is comprised only by MT 
countries only – hence the control group is comprised only by MT country observations 
before they started MT. In contrast, under random effects, the control group is broadened 
to include all country-year observations of 34 non-MT countries. Hence one should 
exercise care in comparing results across estimations based on such large differences in 
control groups and overall sample size. 
We find significant evidence for the influence of our two variables that jeopardize a 
successful MT implementation, namely, financial development and money growth 
volatility. Financial development and money growth volatility show the expected signs and 
are highly significant at conventional levels. This evidence is generally robust across fixed-
effects and random-effects estimations, notwithstanding their large sample differences. 
Unsurprisingly, we obtain incongruent results in terms of signs and statistical significance 
when we neglect country heterogeneity by estimating pooled regressions. Therefore the   8
absence of country heterogeneity under pooled-data estimation is a severe limitation of this 
technique, which leads us to abandon it subsequently.  
Now we turn to our additional potential determinants of the likelihood of the MT 
regime. Trade openness – as proxy for international best practice in macro regimes and 
structural reforms – is generally found to be a significant determinant behind the 
abandonment of a MT regime. This result could be associated to the usage of alternative 
monetary frameworks, generally implemented by highly institutionalized countries. 
Government balance also reports the expected sign with a high statistical significance. We 
find that countries with fiscal surplus are more prone to abandon the MT regime and to 
adopt alternative monetary policy schemes (e.g. inflation targeting). This finding is robust 
to all methods, including pooled regressions. 
Keeping in mind the trade-off between fixed and random-effects estimators in sample 
size matters, we perform an additional regression by random-effects (see column 10 of 
table 4) but considering only the countries which experienced some time the adoption of 
the regime (i.e. the sample of movers, which is used in the fixed-effects setup). Our results 
remain robust to this exercise. 
Extending our search for robustness using different control groups, we reduce our full- 
sample control-group comprised by all non-MT countries (results re-stated for comparison 
in column 1 of Table 5) by focusing sequentially on results based on non-MT countries by 
income levels (results reported in columns 2-4 in table 5).
10 Most results remain largely 
unchanged, supporting robustness to different control groups. The one exception is the 
trade openness, which turns out to be significant when the control group is restricted to 
high or middle-income countries but is not significant when control group is low-income 
economies. 
Next we focus on a shorter time period, starting in 1990 and throughout our sample’s 
end-year (2005). The estimation is based on the full country sample available under random 
effects.
11 The results, reported in columns 3-4 of Table 6, confirm significance of financial 
development, government balance and trade openness, but reject a significant contribution 
of money growth volatility. This latter finding is very intuitive because it reveals that this 
variable let to be a strong reason behind the abandonment of the MT regime as many 
countries (in particular, industrial countries) had been decided to adopt alternative 
strategies before 90s. 
                                                 
10 We report only random-effects estimation results because fixed-effects estimation excludes all 
non-IT countries, as discussed above. 
11 We were not able of obtaining convergence for fixed-effects estimations.   9
5.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper, which is unique to the best of our knowledge, we find empirical evidence 
which is consistent with the theoretical arguments behind the abandonment of money-
based targeting. Thus, variables associated to money demand instability play a role against 
the probability of adopting a money-based scheme. 
Moreover, we control for variables like government balance and trade openness, 
getting expected signs and a significant contribution in the likelihood of abandoning the 
MT regime. 
These results are quite robust to alternative specifications and econometric methods. 
Restricting the time sample (i.e. 1990-2005) we obtain the same results except for the case 
of money growth volatility. This may emerge as a sign that money demand instability were 
not longer a reason for abandon the MT regime in the aftermath of the spawn of 







   10
6.  References 
 
Arellano, M. and R. Carrasco (2003). “Binary choice panel data models with 
predetermined variables.” Journal of Econometrics, No. 115, 125-157. 
Arellano, Manuel (2003). “Discrete Choice with Panel Data.” CEMFI. Mimeo. 
Arellano, M. and B. Honoré (2001). “Panel Data Models: Some Recent 
Developments.” Handbook of Econometrics, Vol. 5, Chapter 53. 
Beck, T. R. Levine and N. Loayza (1999). “Finance and the Sources of Growth”. Policy 
Research Working Paper. World Bank. 
Andersen (1970). “Asymptotic properties of Conditional Maximum Likelihood 
Estimators.” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B, 32, 283-301. 
Calderón, César and Lin Liu (2002). “The direction of causality between financial 
development and economic growth”. Documento de trabajo No. 184. Banco 
Central de Chile. 
Chamberlain, Gary (1980). “Analysis of Covariance with Qualitative Data.” The Review 
of Economic Studies. Vol. 47. No. 1. Econometrics Issue, 225-238.  
De Gregorio José and Pablo Guidotti (1995). “Financial development and economic 
growth”. World Development, vol. 23(3), pp. 433-448. 
Fatás, A., I. Mihov and A. Rose (2004). “Quantitative goals for monetary policy.” 
NBER Working Paper 10846. 
Friedman, Milton (1968). “The Role of Monetary Policy.” The American Economic Review, 
Vol. 58, No.1, 1-17.  
Goldfeld, Stephen (1976). “ The Case of Missing Money.” Brookings Papers on 
Economic Activity, Vol. 1976, No. 3, 683-739. 
Goodhart, Charles (1989). “The Conduct of Monetary Policy.” The Economic Journal, 
Vol. 99, No. 196, 293-346.  
Honoré, B. and E. Kyriazidou (2000). “Panel Data Discrete Choice Models with 
Lagged Dependent Variables.” Econometrica, Vol. 68, No. 4, 839-874. 
Kyriazidou, Ekaterini (1997). “Estimation of panel data sample selection model.” 
Econometrica. Vol. 65. No. 6, 1335-1364. 
Levine, Ross (1997). “Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and 
Agenda.” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 35, No. 2, 668-726. 
Levine, R. N. Loayza and T. Beck (1999). “Financial Intermediation: Causility and 
Causes”. Policy Research Working Paper. World Bank.  
Levy-Yeyati, E., and F. Sturzenegger (2003). “To float or to fix: Evidence on the 
impact of exchange rate regimes and growth.” American Economic Review 93(4), 
1173-1193. 
Loayza, N. and R. Ranciere (2002). “Financial development, financial fragility, and 
growth”. Documento de Trabajo No. 145. Banco Central de Chile.  
Neyman, J. and E. Scott (1948). “Consistent estimates based on partially consistent 
observations.” Econometrica. Vol. 16. No. 1, 1-32. 
Masson, P., M. Savastano and S. Sharma (1997). “The Scope for Inflation Targeting in 
Developing Countries.” IMF Working Paper No. 97/130. 
Mishkin, F and M. Savastano (2000). “Monetary Policy Strategies for Latin America.” 
NBER Working Paper, No. 7617. 
Mishkin, F. and K. Schmidt-Hebbel (2002). “A decade of inflation targeting in the 
world: what do we know and what do we need to know? In Inflation Targeting: 
Design, Performance, Challenges, edited by Norman Loayza and Raimundo Soto. 
Banco Central de Chile.   11
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2001). “One decade of inflation targeting in the world: 
what do we know and what do we need to know.” NBER Working Paper No. 
8397. 
Mishkin, F and K. Schmidt-Hebbel (2007). “Does Inflation Targeting Make a 
Difference? In Mishkin, F. and K. Schmidt-Hebbel (eds.) Monetary Policy under 
Inflation Targeting. 
Poirson, H. (2001) “How do countries choose their exchange rate regime?” IMF 
Working Paper WP/01/46, April 
Rizzo, J.-M. (1998). “The economic determinants of the choice of an exchange rate 
regime: A probit analysis.” Economics Letters 59, 283-287 
Schmidt-Hebbel, K. and M. Tapia (2002). “Monetary Policy implementation and results 
in twenty inflation targeting countries.” Central Bank of Chile. Working Paper 
No. 166. 
Schmidt-Hebbel, K and A. Werner (2002). “Inflation Targeting in Brazil, Chile, and 
Mexico: Performance, Credibility, and the Exchange Rate.” Banco Central de 
Chile, Documento de Trabajo, No. 171. 
World Development Indicators (2007). The World Bank. 
von Hagen, J., and J. Zhou (2004). “The choice of exchange rate regime in developing 
countries: A multinomial panel analysis.” CEPR Discussion Paper Series No. 
4227, February 
   12
7.  Data Appendix 
 
We construct an annual panel data set comprised of 110 countries for the period 1975-
2005. See the list of countries in table 3. 
For the dependent variable we construct a dummy variable which is set equal to 1 if the 
country is a money-based targeter, and 0 otherwise. Our classification is based on Fatás et 
al. (2004) from 1975 to 2000, and IMF (AREAER), thereafter. 
For the right-hand side variables we use primarily the Word Bank data set (World 
Development Indicators) because it seems to be a revised version of the IFS database 
constructed by the IMF. This is the case for the measures of trade openness, financial 
development, and the GDP per capita.  
The choice of the measure which better approximates a very complex and aggregate 
variable such as the financial development becomes an issue. The literature has converged 
to the use of the measure based on the domestic credit canalized to the private sector 
(scaled by GDP)
12. Two reasons at least emerge for explaining this general practice. First, 
domestic credit is the closest definition linked to the concept of financial intermediation. 
Second, the nature of the agents which at last receive the funds also matters. It is probable 
that the financial functions, which in turn foster the presence of financial intermediaries
13, 
would be accomplished in a scenario in which purely private agents interact, thus 
abstracting from distortions coming public managed funding services. 
The overall budget balance is assembled based on the Government Financial Statistics 
(prepared by the IMF), the Economist Intelligence Unit and figures found in official 
government’s web pages. Finally, for accounting for the role of the volatility of nominal 
shocks we perform rolling calculations of the coefficient of variation for the growth of M2. 
The details on the construction and the sources of all these variables we used in the 
estimations are shown in table 1.  
 
                                                 
12 For instance, Beck, Levine and Loayza (1999), Levine, Loayza and Beck (1999), Calderón and Liu 
(2002), and Loayza and Ranciere (2002) use a similar measure. De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) 
were the first at remarking the appealing of using this variable. 




Table 1: Determinants of MT Regime Likelihood in this Paper: Expected Signs and 




































EIU  Negative Negative 
GDP per 
capita 
Log of the 
GDP per 
capita 
WDI (2007) Negative  Not 
significant 
Trade 
openness  (X+M)/GDP WDI  (2007) Ambiguous Negative 
  Source: Own elaboration 
 Notes: 
  WDI: Word Development Indicators 
  GFS: Government Financial Statistics 
  EIU: The Economist Intelligence Unit   14






High income OECD (23) 
AUS Australia FRA France KOR Korea ESP Spain
AUT Austria DEU Germany LUX Luxembourg SWE Sweden
BEL Belgium GRC Greece NLD Netherlands CHE Switzerland
CAN Canada IRL Ireland NZL New Zealand GBR United Kingdom
DNK Denmark ITA Italy NOR Norway USA United States
FIN Finland JPN Japan PRT Portugal





Upper middle income (12)
ARG Argentina MYS Malaysia
BWA Botswana PAN Panama
CRI Costa Rica TUR Turkey
CHL Chile URY Uruguay
MEX Mexico VEN Venezuela
MUS Mauritius ZAF South Africa
Lower middle income (13)
BRA Brazil LKA Sri Lanka
COL Colombia PER Peru
CHN China PRY Paraguay
EGY Egypt, Arab Rep. PHL Philippines
IDN Indonesia THA Thailand
IRN Iran, Islamic Rep. TUN Tunisia
JAM Jamaica
Lower income (13)
BGD Bangladesh MWI Malawi
ETH Ethiopia SDN Sudan
GHA Ghana SLE Sierra Leone
GIN Guinea UGA Uganda
GMB Gambia, The ZAR Congo, Dem. Rep.
HTI Haiti ZMB Zambia
MDG Madagascar  
   15
 
Table 3: Pair-wise Cross-Country and Panel Data Correlations 
 










dummy regime 1 -0.224 -0.093 -0.230 -0.286 -0.178
trade openness -0.220 1 0.032 0.301 0.228 0.033
financial development 0.003 -0.002 1 0.077 -0.107 -0.041
GDP per capita 0.013 0.304 0.029 1 0.251 -0.159
government budget 
balance (surplus)
-0.149 0.053 -0.004 0.191 1 0.107
money growth 
volatility
-0.046 0.013 -0.014 -0.030 0.036 1
 
  Source: Own elaboration based on the WDI data set. 
  Numbers in bold denote correlation coefficients statistically significant at 5 percent at maximum 
  Numbers in the inferior triangle are the cross correlations across the time and countries (pooled correlations) while the numbers 
   in the superior triangle are cross correlations across countries (among time demeaned variables) 
   16
Table 4
Choice of Monetary Targeting Regime: full sample estimations
Dependent variable: dummy for Money Targeting Regime (Money targeting=1; non-money targeting=0)
Estimation mthods: Discrete-choice logit panel-data models
Sample: 1975-2005 (annual data)
123 4 56 789 1 0 1 1 1 2
Financial development 0.409 ** 0.538 *** 0.471 *** -2.645 *** -2.666 *** -2.832 *** -1.534 ** -1.830 ** -2.256 *** -0.936 ** 0.285 *** -1.542 ***
(2.04)  (2.58) (2.73) (3.30) (3.13) (3.64) (2.44) (2.52) (3.79) (2.03) (2.85) (3.74)
Money instability (5 years) -0.114 -0.091 -0.092 -0.781 ** -0.718 ** -0.723 ** -0.383 ** -0.431 ** -0.450 ** -0.64 ** -0.054 -0.282 **
(1.58) (1.34) (1.35) (2.56) (2.27) (2.27) (2.26) (2.19) (2.25) (2.24) (1.39) (2.27)
Government budget balance - -8.191 *** -8.181 *** - -14.376 ** -14.616 *** - -13.873 *** -14.220 *** -13.932 *** -4.987 *** -8.699 ***
- (4.56) (4.56) - (2.55) (2.59) - (2.75) (2.80) (2.88) (4.65) (2.95)
GDP per capita -0.001 -0.065 - 0.394 -0.374 - 0.089 -0.516 - - - -
(0.01) (0.57) - (0.55) (0.46) - (0.22) (0.99) - - - -
Trade openness -1.607 *** -1.878 *** -1.868 *** -2.352 -3.143 * -3.448 ** -2.782 *** -3.628 *** -3.868 *** -2.234 ** -1.108 *** -2.044 **
(6.54)  (6.70) (6.66) (1.44) (1.71) (2.00) (2.69) (2.59) (2.75) (1.99) (6.87) (2.54)
Constant -0.413 -0.067 -0.631 *** - - - 0.030 4.900 0.556 1.675 *** -0.400 *** 0.029
(0.44) (0.07) (2.94) - - - (0.01) (1.08) (0.50) (2.70) (3.13) (0.04)
Observations 1174 1096 1096 576 473 473 1174 1096 1096 473 1096 1096
N u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 6 3 5 5 5 52 9 2 22 26 3 5 55 5 2 25 55 5
Countries with the MT regime 22 22 22 29 22 22 29 22 22 22 22 22
Countries without the MT regime 41 33 33 0 0 0 34 33 33 0 33 33
(control group)
LR statistic 68.76 92.34 92.01 36.60 53.11 52.89 30.44 54.01 50.81 39.53 95.59 38.32
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Random 
effects
Logit panel data models
Random 
effects
Probit panel data models
Fixed effects Random effects Pooled Pooled  17
Table 5
Choice of Monetary Targeting Regime: sensitivity to alternative control groups
Dependent variable: dummy for Money Targeting Regime (Money targeting=1; non-money targeting=0)
Estimation mthods: Discrete-choice logit panel-data models
Sample: 1975-2005 (annual data)
1234
Financial development -2.256 *** -2.786 *** -2.315 *** -2.254 ***
(3.79) (4.32) (3.49) (3.19)
Money instability (5 years) -0.450 ** -0.514 ** -0.589 ** -0.880 ***
(2.25) (2.35) (2.49) (2.71)
Government budget balance -14.220 *** -14.105 *** -16.222 *** -15.399 ***
(2.80) (2.69) (3.06) (2.92)
Trade openness -3.868 *** -3.280 ** -3.310 ** -1.493
(2.75) (2.23) (2.36) (1.01)
Constant 0.556 1.755 1.496 1.870 *
(0.50) (1.57) (1.38) (1.82)
Observations 1096 810 790 556
T o t a l  n u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 5 54 14 03 2
Countries with the MT regime 22 22 22 22
Countries without the MT regime 33 19 18 10
(control group)
LR statistic 50.81 48.97 42.97 30.98
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Note: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
When we allow for different country control groups we consider both the countries that have the regime in place (movers) and 
those countries that have not experienced a regime change (stayers)






















Choice of Monetary Targeting Regime: sensitivity to alternative time samples
Dependent variable: dummy for Money Targeting Regime (Money targeting=1; non-money targeting=0)
Estimation mthods: Discrete-choice logit panel-data models
1234
Financial development -2.832 *** -2.256 *** -5.287 ** -2.769 ***
(3.64) (3.79) (2.50) (3.13)
Money instability (5 years) -0.723 ** -0.450 ** -0.473 -0.320
(2.27) (2.25) (1.41) (1.48)
Government budget balance -14.616 *** -14.220 *** -16.644 ** -19.674 ***
(2.59) (2.80) (2.22) (2.94)
Trade openness -3.448 ** -3.868 *** -10.639 *** -8.145 ***
(2.00) (2.75) (3.29) (3.69)
Constant - 0.556 - 3.295 **
- (0.50) - (2.11)
Observations 473 1096 214 601
T o t a l  n u m b e r  o f  c o u n t r i e s 2 25 51 95 5
Countries with the MT regime 22 22 19 19
Countries without the MT regime 0 33 0 36
(control group)
LR statistic 52.89 50.81 46.94 49.47
p - v a l u e 0 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 0
Note: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses











Figure 1: Adoption of Money-based Targeting  












1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
MT regime IT regime
 
 Source:  Own elaboration based on Fatás et al. (2004) and IMF (several issues). 
  Blue bars denote the number of countries which operate under a MT regime, while yellow bars denote the same  
  for the IT regime case. 
  The data on monetary targeting dates and counties corresponds to Fatás et al. (2004) from 1975 to 2000,  




Figure 2: Adoption of Money-based Targeting  
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